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Introduction 
 
In the very early months of 1950 the management of Magyar Pamutipar, a leading 
Budapest textile factory, began to alter the system by which the factory maintenance 
staff were paid. Prior to that date they had been paid according to work targets that 
were established at the level of the group; thus the collective rather than the individual 
was measured in order to establish the basis of remuneration. The authorities were 
especially keen to see that the individual became the unit on which the wage was 
established. The rhetoric of their justification for this shift was surprisingly anti-
collectivist - without individual norms, or work targets, individual contributions to the 
economy could not be measured. Furthermore, work discipline could not be 
maintained if good workers within a group were to be remunerated at the same level 
as the bad and the lazy 1. 
 
It has been widely assumed that Stalinism was highly collectivist both in its ideology 
and in its practice. It has been seen as being at an extreme of a state socialist paradigm 
characterised by the elimination of individual civil rights, property rights and in some 
variants the abolition of a distinction between public and private spheres altogether. 
• - This article grew out of research for my PhD. Thesis (Mark Pittaway Industrial Workers, 
Socialist Industrialisation and the State in Hungary, 1948-1958, Department of Economic and 
Social History, University of Liverpool, 1998). The author would like to thank the ESRC 
(Economic and Social Research Council) for the funding to carry out the research on which this 
article is based. He would also like to thank Nigel Swain, Martha Lampland, András Tóth, Padraic 
Kenney, Marley Weiss and three anonymous referees for their comments.  
•  
1
 - Pamut Újság, 1st January 1950 
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The contradiction between the apparent assumption of "individualisation" that 
characterised socialist wage systems and the collectivist ideology of the regime in 
Hungary was noticed in the later socialist period. Miklós Haraszti commented on how 
"in one newspaper, a Hungarian expert on "management science" claimed that 
payment-by-results was the ideal form of socialist wages. It was, he said, the 
embodiment of the principle "from each according to his capacity, to each according 
to his work". But in another issue of the same paper a veteran communist who now 
holds a high position warmly remembered a former comrade in arms who had been 
prominent before the war in the organisation of workers' demonstrations against the 
Bedeaux system - the "scientific" system of payment by results then in force" 2. 
 
A large number of sociological studies of shop floor relations have drawn attention 
not merely to the contradiction between the collectivism of regime ideology and the 
wage systems it endorsed for the late socialist period in Hungary, but also to the lack 
of control the state exercised over the conditions of production. According to such 
accounts the dynamics of shop relations during economic reform in Hungary were 
determined by the phenomena of shortage, informal bargaining, widespread 
participation in the informal economy and managerial attempts to create “hegemonic” 
factory regimes based on range of unofficial rules partially hidden from the eyes of 
the state 3. 
 
2
 - Miklós Haraszti A Worker in a Worker's State, p.21, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1977 
 
3
 - There is an enormous social scientific literature which describes these phenomena in the 1970s and 
1980s, see Nigel Swain Hungary: the Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism, Chapter 6, Verso, London 
and New York, 1992 for an excellent overview of the research; for a sample of the more important 
studies see Michael Burawoy The Politics of Production: factory regimes under capitalism and 
socialism, especially Chapter 4, Verso, London and New York, 1985; Michael Burawoy & János 
Lukács The Radiant Past. Ideology and Reality in Hungary's Road to Capitalism, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1992; Péter Galasi & György Sziráczki (eds.) Labour Market 
and Second Economy in Hungary, Campus, Frankfurt & New York, 1985; Lajos Héthy & Csaba 
Makó Munkásmagtartasok és gazdasági szervezet, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1972; Lajos Héthy & 
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Whilst none of this literature explicitly dealt with the situation on the shop floor 
during the period of Stalinist rule much of it implicitly assumed that the spread of 
informality on Hungarian shop floors was a product of gradual, yet progressive waves 
of economic reform as a highly despotic state conceded power to actors at local level. 
István Kemény, for example, argues that informal bargaining over norms was a 
creation of the climate in the factories following the 1956 Revolution. Michael 
Burawoy and János Lukács imply, based on their research in Hungary, that “despotic” 
factory regimes under state socialism are replaced by “hegemonic” ones, founded 
around informal bargaining and co-operation between management and workforce, 
when “the market provision of consumer goods and services” associated with 
economic reform destroys the basis on which the state is able to discipline and 
mobilise labour 4. 
 
In these accounts, therefore, economic reform under state socialism creates space 
through which workers are able to exercise considerable countervailing power on the 
shop floor. This assumption is maintained through an implied contrast between the 
reformist state of the late socialist period and the despotic state of the Stalinist years 
which is able to subordinate industrial workers to its political programme on the shop 
Csaba Makó Munkások, Érdekek, Érdekegyeztetés, Gondolat, Budapest, 1978; István Kemény 
Ouvriers hongrois, 1956-1985, Éditions L'Harmattan, Paris, 1985; István Kemény Velük 
nevelkedett a gép. Magyar munkások a hetvenes évek elején, VITA, Budapest, 1990; Ákos Róna-Tas 
The Great Surprise of the Small Transformation: the Demise of Communism and the Rise of the Private 
Sector in Hungary, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1997; David Stark "The 
Micropolitics of the Firm and the Macropolitics of Reform: New Forms of Workplace Bargaining in 
Hungarian Enterprises" in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer & Evelyne Huber Stephens (eds.) States 
versus Markets in the World-System, pp. 247-73, SAGE, Beverley Hills, 1985; David Stark 
"Rethinking Internal Labor Markets: New Insights from a Comparative Perspective", American 
Sociological Review, Vol.51, pp.492-504, 1986; David Stark "Coexisting Organizational Forms in 
Hungary's Emerging Mixed Economy" in Victor Nee & David Stark with Mark Selden (eds.) 
Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe, pp. 137-168, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, California, 1989 
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floor. Such accounts seem to contradict much of the recent historical literature dealing 
with Stalinism in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This work has 
demonstrated that industrial workers were endowed with a considerable degree of 
countervailing power vis-à-vis the early socialist state. It has demonstrated in contexts 
that range from the Soviet Union of the 1930s, through the Poland of the late 1940s, 
to the East Germany of the 1950s and 1960s that labour was mobilised by the state, 
and that in turn workers were able to subvert state intentions and in doing so re-make 
the institutions of socialism at the local level 5. 
 
This article demonstrates that “hegemonic” factory regimes characterised by a high 
degree of co-operation between at least a core of the workforce and management 
dominated industry in the Stalinist years, as much as they were to characterise the 
conditions of production in a climate of economic reform. It shows furthermore that 
they emerged from economic tensions created by the Stalinist state and by worker 
responses  towards them. An examination of how such “hegemonic” factory regimes 
arose suggests a major revision of the traditional image of Stalinism as collectivist. 
The state attempted firstly to use systems of remuneration on the shop floor to bind 
4
 - For this argument see Kemény Ouvriers hongrois, pp.15-6; for the  second argument see Burawoy 
& Lukács The Radiant Past, pp.32-4 
 
5
 - For the early literature dealing with the role of workers in the Soviet industrialisation drive in the 
1930s see Hiroaki Kuromiya Stalin’s Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers 1929-1932, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1988; Vladimir Andrle Workers in Stalin’s 
Russia: Industrialisation and Social Change in a Planned Economy, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel 
Hempstead, 1988; Lewis H. Siegelbaum Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 
1935-1941, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1988; the contributions in William 
G. Rosenberg & Lewis H. Siegelbaum (eds.) Social Dimensions of Soviet Industrialisation, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1993, and Lewis H. Siegelbaum & Ronald Grigor 
Suny (eds.) Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class and Identity, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and 
London, 1994; for two recent excellent contributions to the literature see Stephen Kotkin Magnetic 
Mountain. Stalinism as a Civilisation, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles & 
London, 1995 and Kenneth M. Straus Factory and Community in Stalin’s Russia: the Making of an 
Industrial Working Class, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1998. For Poland in the late 1940s 
see Padraic Kenney Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists 1945-1950, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca and London, 1997; for East Germany see Jeffrey Kopstein Politics of Economic Decline 
in East Germany, 1945-1989, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill & London, 1997 
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workers to the goals of the plan. These systems of remuneration were individual 
rather than collective, suggesting at the heart of classical central planning lay an 
apparent paradox between institutional centralisation and a high degree of 
individualisation at the point of production 6. Embodied in wage systems was a 
specific attempt to discipline the individual worker through using a specific “politics 
of time”. This aimed to force workers to use every minute of working time to produce 
goods as laid out in the plan, to speed up their work, improve their productivity and 
constantly surpass the goals of the plan. The implementation of this system led to a 
breakdown of social solidarity between workers, as the industrial workforce became 
increasingly fragmented. It was not, however, the state’s “politics of time”, something 
similar to the concept of time described by Stephen Hanson in the Soviet context, that 
determined the factory regime on Hungarian shop floors 7. The remaking of wage 
systems and the institutionalisation of central planning was combined with an 
industrialisation drive which generated what János Kornai has conceptualised as an 
“economy of shortage” 8. The combination of shortages of labour and materials 
combined with the disciplines of the plan on both workers and managers produced a 
regime characterised by informal co-operation between the two. This resulted in a loss 
 
6
 - The case made here is close to that argued by István Rév, see his "The Advantages of Being 
Atomized: How Hungarian Peasants Coped with Collectivisation", Dissent, pp. 335-350, 
Summer 1987 
 
7
 - Stephen E. Hanson has shown the way in which a specific concept of time was central in the design 
of Soviet economic institutions (see Stephen E. Hanson Time & Revolution: Marxism and the Design 
of Soviet Institutions, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill & London, 1997). The 
conception of time which Hanson describes in the Soviet context was in many ways similar to that 
which informed the design of Hungarian wage systems. 
 
8
 - János Kornai The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1992  
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of control of the shop floor by the state as early as 1953, whilst social solidarity 
among workers was further undermined by the forms which informal bargaining took. 
 
The Institutionalisation of Central Planning and the Shop Floor 
 
On 20th August 1949 the Peoples' Republic of Hungary sealed its transition to a state 
that sought to embark on "the construction of socialism" with a new constitution. This 
constitution stated clearly that "the basis of the social order of the Hungarian People's 
Republic is work". In addition it laid down the principle that all citizens of the new 
state had an obligation "to work according to their ability" in order to participate in 
"the construction of socialism". In assessing the particular obligation of each citizen 
"the Hungarian People's Republic attempts to realise the socialist principle "from each 
according to their ability, to each according to their need"". This obligation to work 
amounted to the participation of each citizen in the economic life of the country. The 
constitution clearly stated that "the economic life of the Hungarian People's Republic 
is determined by the state people's economic plan". Therefore the economic plan was, 
at least in theory, the institution that regulated the labour obligation of each and every 
citizen in the new state. As such it was to be much more than a means of regulating 
the performance of the economy, though, of course, it was also very much this. It 
aimed to calculate the contribution of every citizen to the generation of the social 
product 9. 
 
This entailed considerable institutional centralisation, as a hierarchical system of 
central planning copied from the Soviet model was introduced. Decision making 
 
9
 - A Dolgozó Nép Alkotmánya - A Magyar Népköztársaság Alkotmánya, pp.37-9, Szikra, Budapest, 
1949 
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authority within the system would be vested in the government through the Council of 
Ministers and in the Peoples' Economic Council (Népgazdasági Tanács - N.T.) 
established in 1949 as an overall co-ordinating body. This set the framework within 
which planning was to take place. The planning process itself was overseen and 
conducted by the National Planning Office (Országos Tervhivatal -O.T.). As the 
institutions of central planning were consolidated it assumed the role of nerve centre 
within the economy, translating the directives of both the Council of Ministers and the 
N.T. into general quantitative plans for the economy as a whole and its individual 
sectors 10. 
 
Each sector of the economy was supervised by a branch ministry. Within each branch 
ministry there were a number of industrial directorates that devised the plans for each 
enterprise within the appropriate sub-sector 11. Following from the pioneering study 
by János Kornai in 1955 of the operation of the system of planning devised in 1949 in 
light industry, those seeking to critically examine the system have sought to examine 
the tension within it between excessive centralisation and the requirements of the 
enterprise unit. Analyses based on this approach tend to conceptualise the enterprise 
as the basic unit in socialist production, and as the organisation that sought to respond 
to the mixture of instruction, incentives and regulations that were issued by higher 
 
10
 - On the broad outlines of classical Soviet central planning in its Hungarian context see Swain 
Hungary, pp.55-8; Iván T. Berend & György Ránki The Hungarian Economy in the Twentieth 
Century, pp.208-10, Croom Helm, London & Sydney, 1985; Iván Petõ & Sándor Szakács A 
hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története 1945-1985 I. Az újjáépités és a tervutasitásos 
irányitás idõszaka, pp.104-20, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1985; on the 
importance of quantitative targets in Hungarian economic planning see Martha Lampland The 
Object of Labor: Commodification in Socialist Hungary, especially Chapter 5, Chicago University 
Press, Chicago and New York, 1995 
 
11
 - On the creation of the branch ministries see Petõ & Szakács A hazai gazdaság...., pp.110-2; Swain 
Hungary, p.55; ; Iván T. Berend A Szocialista Gazdaság fejlõdése Magyarországon 1945-
1968, pp.86-7, Kossuth Könyvkiadó & Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1974; 
Nicolas Spulber The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, p.76, The Technology Press 
∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
∑∑∑∑ 
authorities. Such an assumption would, of course, seem to contradict the view that 
running almost in parallel to the process of collectivist centralisation there was also a 
process of individualisation. Whilst for a variety of reasons enterprises responded as 
units to the instruction of planners in practice, the structure of the central planning 
system was based on the assumption that the individual producer, not the enterprise 
unit was the basis of the plan 12. 
 
Comprehensive Soviet style economic planning sought to re-define the role of the 
enterprise turning it from the legally autonomous entity of capitalist society into a 
mere administrative level within the planning process. The first manifestation of this 
shift was the beginning of the process of "profilisation" in 1948. This essentially 
meant that every enterprise, so that its production range would be transparent to 
central planner, should have a "profile", a range of products for which it had exclusive 
or near exclusive responsibility. Enterprises lost production units that produced goods 
which came under different industrial directorates, or even ministries 13. 
 
The state aimed to decentralise the implementation of the plan to units below that of 
the enterprise often combining this with the principle of "profilisation" to produce a 
series of re-organisations across industry during the early 1950s. This process of re-
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology & John Wiley & Sons. Inc., with Chapman & Hall 
Ltd., New York & London, 1957  
 
12
 - The classic study is János Kornai Overcentralisation in Economic Administration: A Critical 
Analysis Based on Experience in Hungarian Light Industry, translated by John Knapp, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford and New York, 1994; for an example of an analysis of classical Stalinist 
central planning which erroneously identifies the enterprise as the basic unit of the central planning 
system see Berend A szocialista gazdaság fejlõdése, pp.87-93 
 
13
 - On the process of "profilisation" see Petõ & Szakács A hazai gazdaság.....,pp.112-4 Iván T. 
Berend Gazdaságpolitika az elsõ ötéves terv megindulásakor 1948-1950, pp.17-9, 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1964; Swain Hungary, pp.57-8 
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organisation in order to secure more effective control of production took the form of 
the creation of Trusts in industry. This was clearly illustrated by the example of the 
Tatabánya coal mines where such a Trust was formed in early 1952. This acted as a 
strategic planning unit for the whole of the mines with considerable responsibility for 
labour management and social policy. It drew up and monitored the performance of 
the separate production plans for factory and workshop units under its control 14. 
Though the Trust was the general model of sub-enterprise planning in Stalinist 
Hungary it could never be applied to the whole of industry. In textiles the 
implementation of the principle of "profilisation" led to planners by-passing the 
enterprise level in some plants. In the heavy engineering sector enterprises were 
divided into "self-accounting units" (önelszámoló egységek). These units each had 
their own distinct profile and contained all of the technical administration necessary 
for the production of the goods in each units "profile". Each unit was responsible not 
only for fulfilling its plan but for controlling its production costs 15. 
 
The basic subject of the plan was not the factory unit or workshop but the individual 
producer. From 1949 onwards attempts were made to individualise economic plans, 
for each individual worker there would, at least on paper, be an individual Five Year 
Plan. This process was known as the "breaking down of the plan" (tervfelbontás) and 
was attempted in a large number of enterprises and factory units. The breaking down 
of the plan to individual producers was far from uniformly achieved. Very little 
information exists on the proportion of workers working to an individual plan, and 
 
14
 - The best source for the various organisational changes to the mines in Tatabánya can be found in 
Sándor Rozsnyói "A város nagyüzemei" in Gábor Gombkötö et al. (ed.) Tatabánya Története. 
Helytörténeti Tanulmányok II. Kötet, p.87, Tatabánya Városi Tanács VB, Tatabánya, 1972 
 
15
 - For a description of how "profilisation" in other cases see Péter Hanák & Katalin Hanák A 
Magyar Pamutipar Története, 1887-1962, pp. 314-5, A PNYV Magyar Pamutipar 1. sz. 
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such figures would make little sense in examining the practice of labour relations in 
the socialist economy simply because of the disorganisation of production. Regime 
intentions are provided by an examination of the situation in individual factories. In 
the workshop of the United Electrics Factory that made radio components, for 
example, in summer 1951, of 1341 employees in total 582 worked to individual plans 
even though 767 had individual labour competition records. Given the complexity of 
individualising factory plans management often adopted a more indirect method; the 
total maximum working time of an individual worker over five years would be 
calculated and any worker who completed work that was supposed to have taken that 
time as defined by the work norms  was judged to have completed their plan. It was 
on this basis that the state drew attention to the achievements of individual 
Stakhanovites, who according to regime propaganda had completed their individual 
First Five Year Plans in under five years 16.  
 
The individual producer was central to the planning process. In particular the 
individual was central to the process of labour planning. In an economy that was not 
driven by fully autonomous firms subject to the discipline, at least on a theoretical 
level, of the market, alternative criteria had to be devised by which enterprises 
determined how many workers should be employed. The major criterion was that of 
the degree of labour power that needed to be utilised to produce a particular product. 
The level of employment would then become a matter of simple calculation for the 
planners. They would determine what needed to be produced, the amount of labour 
power required to produce those goods could then be calculated through scientific 
Gyáregysége, Budapest, 1964; József Szekeres & Árpád Tóth A Klement Gottwald (Ganz) 
Villámossági Gyár Története, p.266, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1962 
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norms, and from this calculation the total level of employment in the economy could 
be determined 17. 
 
These systems profoundly affected social relations on Hungarian shop floors. The 
individualisation of production that central planning heralded was reflected in the re-
shaping of the systems of remuneration, and indeed the organisation of production 
itself. The raft of measures and systems, ranging from norms to piece-rates, through to 
labour competition campaigns directly bound workers to the system of centralised 
economic planning. It is to the re-shaping of production on the shop floor as central 
planning was implemented and to the reform of system of remuneration that attention 
is now turned. 
 
The Industrial Wage Relation and the Individualisation of Production, 1948-
1950 
 
From 1948 onwards the state sought more direct control over production as the 
authorities began to introduce the institutions of comprehensive economic planning 
across the economy. Wage policy shifted as the authorities began to move towards 
greater dependence on so-called precise norms, calculated by scientific means which 
by their nature were standardised. This entailed firstly a reform of the system of 
payment-by-results and secondly a move to reform the organisation of production 
itself. 
16
 - Budapest Fõváros Levéltára (Budapest City Archive, hereafter BFL) XXIX/321/2d.; Tervfelbontás 
a Rádiócsõgyártában 1951 augusztus 11-tõl 18-ig; for the best known example of this see Károly Déri 
Pióker Ignác - Ötéves Terv Huszonhárom Hónap Alatt, p.3, Népszava, Budapest, 1952 
 
17
 - This system of labour power planning was effectively incorporated into the yearly economic plans 
in 1950, that is for the 1951 Peoples' Economic Plan. For an explanation of this principle see 
Munkaerõtartalék, August 1951, pp.251-7 
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The reform of the system of payment-by-results began in January 1948 with the so-
called second supplement to the collective agreements of that year. Norms had been in 
existence since 1945 but these were linked to statistical estimates of previous 
production in a given plant. In many cases they had been informally established on a 
decentralised basis at the point of production. As far as the authorities were concerned 
this was a problem as they sought to control the ways in which the norms were 
established. It called for the introduction of new, so-called szabatos or precise norms, 
calculated on the basis of "scientific" principles. Where such norms were not brought 
into being earnings would be cut by revising the statistical norms downwards, average 
norm fulfilment in November 1947 would act as the base line that would be used to 
determine 100% fulfilment 18. 
 
The introduction of "scientifically" established precise norms met with one major 
obstacle from the shop floor, namely the high degree of control of the job and 
remuneration enjoyed by certain groups of skilled workers. This control had been 
largely exercised through close control by the skill sections of certain unions, 
particularly the Metalworkers, of the labour market for particular groups of skilled 
workers so that a high degree of union control over job rates could be exercised. This 
was paralleled by a high degree of control on the shop floor, especially where piece 
based systems were in force, by the shop stewards over pay claims in order to regulate 
the rates of skilled workers. The case of how union control of the labour process and 
remuneration worked in a workshop of a railway repair shop in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s describes this process well. The shop steward had to approve of the rate 
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for a specific job before it was given to the turners in the workshop. The fulfilment of 
rate was not measured individually, or directly by management, but by the shop 
steward in order to preserve a "solidaristic wage policy" operated by the union on 
behalf of its members. There is considerable evidence that such practices had not 
merely survived but remained widespread in many sectors, particularly in heavy 
engineering and machine manufacture, at the end of the 1940s. In the machine 
manufacture shop of the United Electrics Factory in 1948 there were frequent 
complaints that the shop stewards controlled the performance of turners, instructing 
them to make no more than 135% of their norm, when they could have easily made 
170% 19. 
 
The state attempted to break these solidarities by generalising labour competition, 
thus mobilising all workers to bust rates, and as such needed to secure the consent of 
large sections of the workforce. It also aimed to pave the way for planning production 
at the shop floor level. From 15th March 1948 until 31st August the first National 
Labour Competition was held. Each enterprise and shop formed a competition 
committee in which the social organisations, management and to an extent the 
workforce were to discuss changes in work organisation necessary to improve 
productivity. All enterprises and shops were then to be assessed through various 
criteria based on production, productivity, and good work discipline. Rewards were 
then distributed to those units in each sector with the highest point scores that were in 
turn distributed among the workers. Central to this was an attempt to modify work 
18
 - The best account of the policy background to this attempts is Sándor Rákosi "Normarendezések 
1948-1950-ben" in János Molnár, Sándor Orbán & Károly Urbán (eds.) Tanulmányok a 
magyar népi demokrácia negyven évérõl, pp.202-4, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1985 
 
19
 - For the case of the railway repair shop see András Tóth Civil társadalom és szakszervezetek, pp. 72-
3, kandídátusi értekezés, Budapest, 1994; on the United Electrics Factory in 1948 see Magyar Országos 
Levéltár MSZMP Budapesti Bizottság Archiviuma (Hungarian National Archive, Archive of the 
∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
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practices, and fundamental to the attack on traditional shop floor solidarities was the 
launch of the brigade movement, and brigade competition. This aimed to unify all 
workers engaged in a given production process into a unit that would then compete 
using centrally defined criteria with other units, or brigades, for which they would be 
given rewards. This would be measured against newer and more explicitly 
decentralised economic plans. As the labour competition was continued throughout 
1948 brigades spread throughout industry 20. 
 
Workers participated in the labour competition for purely instrumental reasons. In the 
Magyar Pamutipar cotton plant, for example, throughout the summer of 1948 the 
semi-skilled and largely female machine operators were mobilised behind the labour 
competition through the tangible increases in pay that the competition brought. This 
instrumental support for the competition was very much a two edged sword for the 
regime. Firstly, such instrumental attitudes allowed the regime to mobilise support 
around the notion of a re-shaping of labour organisation and of the institutions of 
production, which smoothed the introduction of comprehensive central planning at 
factory level. Secondly it made this support conditional upon the continued growth in 
workers' earnings. The degree to which support for the competition was dependent on 
earnings growth, however, was demonstrated to some extent by the way in which the 
competition led to abuses in terms of work practices, and in the use of machinery and 
raw materials in the constant struggle to drive up production. The productivist 
emphasis of the competition combined with the pressure to overfulfil norms led to an 
Budapest Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, hereafter MOL M-Bp.)-134f./4ö.e., 
p.104 
 
20
 - The 1948 labour competitions are described in Társadalmi Szemle, April-May 1948, pp.299-315; 
Társadalmi Szemle, August-September 1948, pp. 513-36; Politiktörténeti Intézet Levéltára (Archive of 
the Institute for the History of Politics, hereafter PIL) 274f.20/23ö.e., pp.73-6 
∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
∑∑∑∑ 
"overly intense work-tempo .... which went together with disadvantages in terms of 
quality" 21. 
 
From the middle of 1949 the state began to explicitly individualise production. The 
focus of labour competition began to change to fit this emerging economic model. 
The state increasingly began to criticise the enterprises for giving insufficient weight 
to what it saw as "the most important basic condition of the labour competition 
movement, the individual labour competition". Such an individual labour competition 
movement was regarded as a fundamental part of the individualisation of production 
obligations, given that in the forms of labour competition that had existed hitherto 
"whilst the factories had globally joined one stage in the labour competition, the 
degree to which the implementation of particular tasks helped the totality of an 
enterprise fulfil its work". Not only was individual labour competition designed to 
provide planners with information on how plans could be individualised, it also 
formed part of an intensification of the state's drive against traditional work practices. 
The state aimed to promote particular individuals within production in order to 
measure particular work methods that they could then record and use to re-organise 
production in other factories and base newer, more scientific norms upon such 
methods 22. 
 
During the Autumn of 1949 the stress of regime policy was to promote individual 
competition and to identify those individuals who would be capable of achieving real 
 
21
 - Pamutipari Értesítõ, 1st June 1948; MOL M-Bp.-136f./3ö.e., p.65; MOL M-Bp.-136f./3ö.e., pp.79-
80 
 
22
 - Szakszervezetek Közpönti Levéltára (Central Archive of the Trade Unions, hereafter SZKL) 
Szakszervezetek Országos Tanácsa (National Council of Trade Unions, hereafter SZOT) Közgazdaság 
(Economics Department)/46d./1949; A Magyar Munkaverseny Mozgalom Fejlõdése, p.4; on the plans 
∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
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changes in their own work methods to improve productivity. The whole phenomenon 
assumed the role of a campaign leading up to the 70th birthday of Stalin on 21st 
December 1949. Between the beginning of September and the middle of November 
participation in individual labour competition increased enormously as a result of the 
campaign with the numbers of declared individual competitors increasing fivefold in 
some factories. Again it was those factories where traditional work practices 
predominated that were the focus of the introduction of individual competition like 
the United Electrics. In this firm the number of individual competitors rose from 6 at 
the end of August to 450 by the end of October 23. 
 
Faced with endemic worker control over the job the authorities across the country 
sought to identify candidates to become new a kind of individual competitor. They 
would seek to break rates spectacularly. It was this process that gave birth to the 
Stakhanovite movement in Hungary. In the United Electrics the machine manufacture 
shop was the focus of this campaign. The future Stakhanovites were carefully picked 
from among the workforce of the plant by management and the authorities who 
carefully exploited the social, political and personal tensions in the shops to persuade 
and coerce workers into the movement 24. 
 
During the shift held to commemorate Stalin's birthday on 21st December 1949 in the 
United Electrics machine shop, as in other plants up and down the country, production 
was explicitly re-organised to ensure that the new Stakhanovites achieved exceptional 
and processes by which individual competition was to be and was used to make new norms see SZKL 
SZOT Közgazdaság/3d./1949; Kiváló teljesitmények vizsgálatáról készült összefoglalás 
 
23
 - For the national picture with individual competition see MOL M-Bp.-95f.2/296ö.e., p.157; MOL 
M-Bp.-95f.4/147ö.e., p.42 
 
∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
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levels of production. The factory newspaper celebrated "the good organisation of 
production" and the fact that "the preparation of tools and raw materials was 
decisive", whilst "the tool room worked like never before". Rising wages as a result of 
increased production during the campaign created considerable enthusiasm for the 
competition across the country and not just in the plant. In Újpest there were reports 
of individuals arriving at work an hour before the beginning of their shift. In one Gyõr 
factory the party secretary described the feeling during the Stalin shift as being like 
that at a football match. The state's aim of individualising production relations had 
been significantly advanced by the spread of individual labour competition. 
Production was re-organised whilst workers had been encouraged to regard their 
contribution to production as an individual, as opposed to a collective act. On to the 
individualisation of the labour competition was superimposed a wage system that 
explicitly tied remuneration to the value of a worker's production as set down in the 
plan 25. 
 
This system was the darrabér, or piece-rate that was introduced across Hungarian 
industry in 1950. Whilst this form was never fully comprehensive it did become the 
hegemonic wage form in industry during the early 1950s. The central component of 
the system was that the work done, not the individual worker, was the subject of 
remuneration. Through this the principle was established that payment should reflect 
the amount and value of what was produced by a worker as laid out in the plan 26. 
24
 - For the intentions of the organisers of individual competition in the factory in this regard see MOL 
M-Bp.-95f.2/295ö.e., p.224; on its beginnings see Tungsram Híradó, 8th September 1949; Tungsram 
Híradó, 5th December 1949 
 
25
 - Tungsram Híradó, 5th January 1950; MOL Bp.-95f.4/147ö.e., pp.134-6; MOL M-Bp.-
95f.2/296ö.e., p.81; MOL M-KS-276f.65/76ö.e., pp.30-1 
 
26
 - For an explanation of the piece rate principle see Sándor Dekán Darrabérrendzerrel a szocialista 
bérezés megvalósitása felé, p.7, Népszava, Budapest, 1950; for important documents on the design of 
∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
∑∑∑∑ 
This opened up the possibility of a worker working on several different hourly wage 
rates on the same shift. In many ways it came to resemble a kind of fee for work done, 
which made it very different from many of the piece-rates existing in capitalist 
factories. There were several important differences, however, between the piece-rate 
and a simple contract fee. The first was that the rate was received within the context 
of an employment relation, theoretically the recipient was not self-employed but was 
legally a waged worker-citizen. The second was the dual nature of the incentive. 
Work was divided into different categories depending on their difficulty that 
determined the rate. This rate would then be paid on the basis of the worker's 
fulfilment of their production norm. The interaction of the piece-rate and the norm 
created a pressure for the worker not only to complete a given number of pieces to 
make an adequate monthly wage but to constantly strive to complete every piece in 
the shortest possible time. The intention behind the system was to completely 
subordinate the worker to the dictates of "clock time" 27, in order to force the workers 
to improve their productivity according to the terms set out in the plan. As such it 
aimed to force workers to maximise the amount of their working time they spent 
performing productive labour. The third difference was that the worker did receive an 
hourly wage when they were not working, the rate was often set at a miserably low 
level by the foreman and linked to the category of work a worker could expect to get 
28
. 
 
the piece rate see SZKL SZOT Közgazdaság/3d./1949; Tervezet a Darrabérendszere Való Áttéres 
Elõkészitésére 
 
27
 - For this term see E.P. Thompson "Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism" reprinted in 
his Customs in Common, pp. 352-403, Penguin Books, London, 1993 
 
28
 - On the process of besorolás see SZKL SZOT Közgazdaság/3d./1949; Tervezet a Darrabérendszere 
Való Áttéres Elõkészitésére, pp.6-7; Dekán Darrabérrendzerrel a szocialista, pp.8-9 
∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
∑∑∑∑ 
 By the Spring of 1950 the state had through labour competition and the wage system 
largely succeeded in individualising work relations. A worker's performance was 
measured strictly on the basis of their individual contribution to the economy, and 
they received their reward as a result of the value of that contribution. Work on the 
shop floor was therefore formally tied to the plan. Despite this the new systems had 
been accepted by workers only on the basis that they led to direct wage increases, a 
situation which undermined attempts by the state to increase productivity. 
Consequently in mid-1950 the state sought to clamp down by revising the norms, in 
order to "close the damaging difference between the wage system .... and the 
production fulfilments achieved in the labour competition" 29.  
 
The tightening succeeded in increasing productivity by cutting the wage funds; the 
amount of money given to enterprises by the central apparatus to cover wage related 
expenses. In heavy industry they fell by 13.5% and in light industry by 11.4% as the 
new system was introduced in August 1950. Yet the increase in productivity was 
bought at the cost of huge reductions in workers' nominal wages at a time of 
accelerating inflation, that smashed any of the trust that had existed between workers 
and "their" new state. Nominal wages fell by 14.3% in heavy industry, 12.5% in light 
industry and 19.4% in overground construction. The introduction of the new norms 
 
29
 - For this see Munkaerõtartalék, August 1951, pp.251-7; Magyar Országos Levéltár MDP-MSZMP 
Közpönti Szervek iratai (Hungarian National Archive, Paper of the Central Organisations of the 
Hungarian Workers' Party - Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, hereafter MOL M-KS)-276f.116/ 
18ö.e., p.34 
 
30
 -  For a more detailed description of the 1950 norm revision campaign see Pittaway Industrial 
Workers, Socialist Industrialisation and the State, pp. 99-104; MOL M-KS-276f.116/19ö.e., pp.129-
30; MOL M-KS-276f.116/19ö.e., pp.220-3; MOL M-KS-276f.116/18ö.e., pp.180-3; MOL M-KS-
276f.116/18ö.e., pp.197-9; MOL M-KS-276f.116/19ö.e., p.1; MOL M-KS-276f.116/19ö.e., p.5; MOL 
M-KS-276f.116/19ö.e., p.58; MOL M-KS-276f.116/19ö.e., pp.43-5 
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was furthermore met by one of the largest waves of worker in the post-war period, 
though open discontent was ruthlessly crushed by the regime 30.  
 
In the medium term the major effect of the 1950 norm revision was to create norms 
that were very difficult for workers to make, a situation that was clearly borne out by 
the statistics from late 1950 on the proportion of workers not making their norms. In 
Újpest in November there were thirteen factories where more than 20% of the 
workforce failed to make 100% of their norms. In the district's textile factories a 
majority of the workforce failed to make them; in one factory the proportion of those 
failing to reach their norm stood at 73.6%. In the Danube Shoe Factory where 32% 
failed to reach their norms another 20% only just made them. The whole process of 
norm revision did not lead to undifferentiated cuts in wages, nor in performance. 
Indeed it seems that the process led rather to the sharpening of inequalities between 
individual workers and between brigades, almost independent of their skill or their 
formal position within the division of labour. On one construction site in the capital 
soon after the introduction of the new norms, the average fulfilment rates of the 
bricklayers varied at between 70 and 169%, the range for carpenters was between 53 
and 139%, whilst for unskilled workers it stood at between 32 and 130%. This was 
also true of other sectors, in the Danube Shoe Factory, where the majority of the 
workforce were either unable or only just able to make their norms there were just 
over 10% of the workforce who were able to achieve rates of over 150%, and a small 
number who able to achieve rates as high as 180%. 
 
This inequality existed partially as a consequence of keeping Stakhanovism alive. 
With the fall off in support for the labour competition that accompanied norm revision 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
the high performances of a small number of workers were maintained by granting 
them preferential access to machines, tools and materials. One former worker in a 
textile factory close to the capital remembered that "the wages were not great and 
permanently fluctuated ...... a large proportion of the weaving machine operators 
earned between 500 and 800 Forints, it was very difficult to get a wage of over 1000 
Forints a month, only party members and Stakhanovites could get that. Of course they 
got the best machines and the 100 or 200 Forint wage supplement" 31. The 
individualisation of production had led to the fragmentation of the workforce, a 
phenomenon exacerbated by the preferential treatment of certain workers by 
management. This process, however, was given enormous impetus by the rise of a 
shortage economy immediately following the norm revision of 1950. This in turn 
undercut the attempts of the regime to use monetary incentives in order to enforce 
their “politics of time” on the shop floor. 
 
Forced Industrialisation, Shortage and Socialist "Flexibility": the effects of 
systemic problems on the shop floor 
  
At the heart of the failure of the regime to subordinate workers to the goals of the plan 
through remuneration attached to their “politics of time” was that the wage system 
rested on the assumption of continuous production. In reality the interaction of the 
plan and the shortage the plan generated created its own peculiar rhythm of 
production, with serious effects on the shop floor and on the earning potential of 
industrial workers. The plan established a calendar for the enterprise as the First Five 
Year Plan was broken down into quantitative annual plans, from there into quarterly 
 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
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plans, then monthly plans and finally even daily plans. Within this tight system of 
deadlines a hierarchy was established. Non-fulfilment of the daily plans alone was not 
an especially serious matter, failure to fulfil a monthly plan might be a cause for 
concern whilst non-fulfilment of a quarterly plan might provoke serious state 
intervention and definitely meant the loss of premiums for managers and technical 
staff 32. 
 
The other determining factor of the rhythm of shop floor production was not planning 
per se, but the nature of the First Five Year Plan, in place during the period. This plan 
had been passed as a law in 1949 and was geared to the rapid development of heavy 
industry, especially of the machine manufacturing sector. The plan was constantly 
revised, with more ambitious targets constantly set for the growth of heavy industry at 
the expense of living standards, agriculture and other light industrial sectors. 
Furthermore the plan sought to expand heavy industrial production without 
appropriately investing in supporting industries 33. 
 
31
 - MOL M-Bp.-95f.4/120ö.e., p.252; MOL M-Bp.-95f.4/120ö.e., p.238; MOL M-Bp.-95f.4/120ö.e., 
p.58; Open Society Archives, Radio Free Europe, Interviews with Escapees, hereafter OSA RFE 
Magyar Gy. 6/ Item No. 5898/54, p.2 
 
32
 - See Kornai Overcentralisation, pp.1-27 for a discussion of how the plans were broken down 
temporally into quarterly planning units and of how non-fulfilment at various points was regarded by 
the authorities.  
 
33
 - For general information on the First Five Year Plan see Petõ & Szakács A hazai gazdaság …., 
pp.151-67; Berend A Szocialista Gazdaság …., p.76; Berend Gazdaságpolitika az elsõ…; István Birta 
“A szocialista iparositási politika néhány kérdése az elsõ  ötéves terv idõszakában”, Párttörténeti 
Közlemények, No.3, pp.113-51, 1970 
 
34
 - Petõ & Szakács A hazai gazdaság, p.189; for a brief contemporary discussion by a senior 
party economic expert see Társadalmi Szemle, February 1953, pp.143-4; for the problems 
this caused on some construction sites see the example of the Budapest metro as discussed 
in Endre Prakfalvi "A budapesti õs-metró (1949-1956)", Budapesti Negyed , No.5, especially 
pp.31-6, Autumn 1994, for a discussion of similar problem on the Sztálinváros construction 
site, the biggest single investment of the First Five Year Plan, see Miklós Miskolczi & András 
Rózsa A Huszéves Dunai Vasmû, p.41, unpublished manuscript, Dunaújváros, 1969. For the 
situation of the cement industry see Ernõ Gerõ A vas, az acél a gépek országért, p.303, 
Szikra, Budapest, 1952, and for Tatabánya see Harc a Szénért, 25th January 1952. On the 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
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The consequences of this kind of production for the economy were very clear as 
enterprises became trapped in a vicious cycle of plan underfulfilment followed by 
severe shortages of raw materials which in turn led to further shortages. This 
environment of shortage had taken hold in some sectors by the second half of 1950, 
but by Spring 1951 had become general. This tendency was at its most extreme on the 
sites of major investments such as the construction of new towns at Tatabánya, Komló 
and Sztálinváros. The building of the Budapest metro and the reconstruction of the 
Diósgyõr steel plants had been constantly plagued by severe shortages of raw 
materials. This was very much a symptom of the problem; certain sectors, especially 
those supplying raw materials to the fastest growing sectors faced unrealistic plans 
that were basically unrealisable. In electrical power generation, for example, the late 
delivery of turbines to the Tatabánya power plants led to the underfulfilment of the 
electrical production plan by early 1952. The growth of shortage goods was fed by the 
more general fact that in the first forty-eight months of the plan, on nine occasions the 
monthly quantity based plan had been under fulfilled leading to an increase in 
shortage products in each case  34.  
plan in general see Petõ & Szakács A hazai gazdaság, pp.195-7 
 
35
 - SZKL SZOT Közgazdaság/18d./1953; Jelentés a munkaverseny, munkafegyelem és a 
munkavédelem alakulásáról a kormányprogramm elhangzása óta, p.2  
 
36
 - MOL M-KS-276f.53/145ö.e.; Tájékoztató az üzemi dolgozók és az üzemi vezetõk által felvetett 
szociális és kultúrális problémákról, p.28 
 
37
 - SZKL SZOT Bérosztály (Wage Department)/28d./1953; Feljegyzés … 
 
38
 - SZKL SZOT Bérosztály/15d./1953; Feljegyzés Varga Elvtársnak a NIM-ben tartott értekezletrõl- a 
munkaerõátcsoportositás terén eddig tett intézkedésekrõl, p.1 
 
39
 - MOL M-KS-276f.53/145 ö.e.; Tájékoztató az üzemi dolgozók és az üzemi vezetõk által felvetett 
szociális és kultúrális problémákról, p.36; SZKL SZOT Bérosztály/2d./1953; A Közpönti Vezetõség 
Terv-, Pénzügyi és Kereskedelmi Osztályának, valamint a Minisztertanács Bértitkárságának észrevétele 
a Nehézipari Minisztérium "A szénbányászat bérhelyzetérõl" szóló elõterjesztéséhez, p.3 
40
 - SZKL SZOT Bérosztály/30d./1953; Bányaipari Dolgozók Szakszervezete Jelentés a bányászat 
jelenlegi bérhelyzetról, p.1; it is interesting to note that the Mineworkers' Union who submitted the 
report did not believe that a monthly wage of 700-800 Forints was sufficient to cover a miners' living 
expenses, let alone 522 Forints, see ibid., p.2 
 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
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These economic problems manifested themselves on the shop floor in three different 
ways. The first was the shortage of raw materials, the second that of labour and the 
third of tools and other kinds of machinery. Because of the dependence of wages on 
finished production shortages of raw materials had direct and catastrophic effects on 
workers’ wage packets. This can be seen by examining the situation in some factories 
over the Summer of 1953 when the problem of raw material shortages grew across 
industry. For example in the Cog Wheel Factory the assembly shop was unable to 
start work on the monthly plan until the 20 July, whilst by the 22nd it had only 45% 
of the materials to reach its target 35. In the Gábor Áron Iron Foundry and Machine 
Factory the failure to guarantee the workers a continuous supply of raw materials led 
the workers’ monthly pay to decline from 1,100-1,200 Forints to 500-550 Forints 36. 
Severe disorganisation of production caused by persistent raw material shortages led 
to continual work stoppages in textiles also; in the Cotton Textile Spinning Plant these 
accounted for 9.31% of total working hours in June, 9.98% in July, and 12.87% in 
August 37. 
 
 The second of these phenomena was that of labour shortage. What particularly 
distinguished it from raw material shortages was the way in which it was pushed by 
low wages. This can be shown through the situation in coal mining which was a 
particularly extreme example of the problem. The wage department of the National 
Council of Trade Unions reported in late 1953 a constant shortage of 6500-6800 
workers in the mines. Though it reported that labour recruitment campaigns could 
successfully recruit 8-10,000 new workers monthly, it stated that this had been 
undermined by a greater level of labour turnover as worker-peasants went back to 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
work in agriculture during the summer months 38. Feeding this high labour turnover 
were the low wages of the unskilled coal hauliers, and cart loaders among whom 
worker-peasants were over represented. Most of these workers left work after about 
two weeks 39. Coal hauliers wages were particularly low for the work that they did. 
One worker Károly Németh working in the Mine No. XV in Tatabánya earned 18.40 
Forints daily, after working 25 shifts and with a 20% supplement for working 
underground he took 552 Forints home at the end of the month, something like half 
the industrial average. It was the lack of workers who could carry away the coal after 
it had been cut which led to the severe disorganisation of production in the mines, 
which hindered the coal cutters from producing and thus fulfilling their norms 40. The 
Csolnoki II mine was forced to stop production outright because of a lack of such 
workers; in Ormospuszta many of the mines were forced to cope with the shortage by 
allocating coal hewers to clear the coal, thus leading to temporary stoppages of work 
at the coal face 41. This led to a situation where only around 50% of skilled workers at 
41
 - MOL M-KS-276f.53/145 ö.e.; Tájékoztató az üzemi dolgozók és az üzemi vezetõk által felvetett 
szociális és kultúrális problémákról, pp.35-6 
 
42
 - SZKL SZOT Bérosztály/28d./1953; Minisztertanács Bértitkársága Javaslat az 1954. évben 
végrehajtandó bérügyi intézkedésekre, p.3 
 
43
 - SZKL SZOT Bérosztály/30d./1953; Feljegyzés Jamrik elvtárs részére; for more detail on the 
findings of the investigation see MOL M-KS-276f.94/588ö.e., p.130  
 
44
 - SZKL SZOT Közgazdaság/18d./1953; Jelentés a munkaverseny, munkafegyelem és a 
munkavédelem alkulásáról a kormányprogramm elhangzása óta, p.3  
 
45
 - Attila Tóth "A pocol tornácán" in József Somorjai ed. Tatabánya 45 Éve Város: Tatabánya várossa 
nyillvánításának 45 évfordulója alkalmából rendezett tudományos konferencia elõadásainak anyaga 
(Tatabánya, 1992 október 1-2), p.127, Komárom-Esztergom Megyei Önkormányzat Múzeumainak 
Igazgatósága, Tata, 1992 
  
46
 - SZKL SZOT Bérosztály/30d./1953; Bõripari Dolgozók Szakszervezete Munkabérosztály Vezetõ 
levél ..., p.2 
 
47
 - MOL M-KS-276f.53/145 ö.e.; Tájékoztató az üzemi dolgozók és az üzemi vezetõk által felvetett 
szociális és kultúrális problémákról, p.44 
 
48
 - MOL M-KS-276f.53/145 ö.e.; Tájékoztató az üzemi dolgozók és az üzemi vezetõk által felvetett 
szociális és kultúrális problémákról, p.30  
 
49
 - MOL M-KS-276f.53/145 ö.e.; Tájékoztató az üzemi dolgozók és az üzemi vezetõk által felvetett 
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the coal face could fulfil their norms 42. In an examination of wage problems in the 
Petõfi Coal Mine in May 1953 it was reported that it "was a really rare case, if a 
worker could gain a percentage at the coal face sufficient to make him a 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
Stakhanovite" 43. This fed a growing problem of worker absenteeism. In June 1953 
the number of shifts missed in the sector was 10,241, a figure that rose in July to 
13,101 44. Indeed so great was the labour shortage that the authorities often deployed 
prison labour to make up the numbers at the coal face; in Tatabánya in 1953 the 
enterprise reported that some 405 prisoners were working in the city 45. Though 
mining was an extreme case, this phenomenon manifested itself to a greater or lesser 
extent in other branches of the economy. In the leather industry generally low wages 
in a tight labour market inevitably led to severe labour shortages, especially of 
unskilled workers; at the Tansics Leather Factory it was reported that when the 
factory managed to recruit new workers, almost without exception, they left the job 
within two days 46.  
 
The third problem related to the over exploitation of machinery and the shortages of 
tools in the plant itself. The poor maintenance of machinery and plant was a severe 
problem, and was gravely exacerbated by labour shortage, as management directed as 
many workers as possible away from maintenance into production. In the Tatabánya 
mines the adoption of this policy by mine management was blamed for poor safety 
conditions 47. Often the incentive structures discouraged enterprises from adequately 
maintaining machinery. They were not credited for maintenance work in the 
calculation of plan fulfilment indicators, yet the expenditure related to such work 
represented a drain on the enterprise wage fund. Such an incentive structure led 
managers to exploit ageing machinery to its limits creating huge backlogs of 
maintenance expenditure. In metalworking the poor state of machinery particularly 
affected workers on tight norms. In the Esztergom Tool and Machinery Factory 
workers on small machines complained that they were in such bad condition and the 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
motors inside them were so weak that it was impossible to make 100% of their norms 
using them 48. Added to this was a very serious shortage of work tools. In the 
Esztergom Tool and Machinery Factory piece rate workers on average spent 30 to 
35% of their working time in search of the tools and materials to finish their job 49. 
 
The cumulative effect of each of these essentially systemic problems was that even 
with very lax norms, the percentage of those failing to reach 100% in ministry 
controlled industry was always high; it stood at 15.5% in June 1953 50. What was 
more important, however, was that the constant pressure of the plan target combined 
with a persistent problem of shortage to change the way in which management 
attempted to utilise labour. This had profound implication for workers' own 
experiences of work and for the rhythms of production. Management attempted to 
"flexibly" deploy labour across the territory of an enterprise, forcing workers to take 
differing jobs, with different wage rates depending on the state of production. In the 
Northern Hungary Chemical Works, a new enterprise, one hundred skilled workers 
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had been trained, but due to raw material shortages could not be given work 
appropriate to their training. As a result they were shifted to different jobs within the 
enterprise. Such "flexibility" had negative consequences for their earnings. It was 
estimated that in October 1953 instead of earning the standard wage of 800 Forints a 
month, they earned only 400-500 Forints instead. This, it was reported, severely 
hindered the smooth operation of the internal labour market within the enterprise 51. 
Such strategies met with serious worker discontent. In the Ózd Metallurgical Works 
one skilled worker complained to a party committee that "there are shops where, 
because of material shortage, they transfer work group leaders, brigade leaders, and 
outstanding workers. That means that they get unskilled workers wages, they can't 
even earn 800 or 900 Forints" 52. 
 
There was another side to the problem of stoppages. When the raw materials arrived 
or when the deadline for plan fulfilment neared, management would need to draw on 
reserves of time and labour to make up the previous shortfall. This would often be 
done through the use of campaign style methods. In sectors producing for export 
because of the poor quality of much of the production, 40-50% of the quarterly plan 
would be produced in the last month, and of this 40-50%, 55-60% was produced in 
the last ten days of the last month 53. Forms of the labour competition and related 
"work" movements could be used to help the enterprises cope with the problem. In the 
Danube Shoe Factory the reorganisation of the export warehouse was done on Sunday 
and classified by the enterprise management as "social" work, so that overtime 
payment could be avoided 54.  
 
 During such periods overtime increased, in many factories unlawfully. In the 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
construction sector, the total expenditure on overtime pay increased by 200,000 
Forints from July to August 1953. In the Láng Machine Factory in September of that 
year plan fulfilment of the monthly plan in the first ten days stood at 10%, yet made 
up the production lag in the second ten with the aid of overtime, which had averaged 
over the year at 30 to 50,000 hours in every month 55. At such times the demand for 
overtime fell on different categories of workers, with high working hours being 
particularly demanded of those workers whose position in the internal division of 
labour of the plant meant that the maintenance of continuous production was 
dependant on them. For some workers overtime became a constant part of working 
life. In the KISTEXT Textile Factory the demand for overtime fell disproportionately 
on both administrative workers and manual workers in the maintenance shop 56. In 
sugar production, the shortage of engineers meant that it was often necessary for 
technical workers to work for eight hours on Sunday without a rest day, in order to 
guarantee the conditions for production during the following week. In spite of this 
situation the central authorities refused to allow overtime to be paid for such work, 
creating enormous problems for the enterprise 57. In those sectors where this was 
required the enterprise became dependent on the "flexibility" of certain categories of 
worker, and this relationship of dependence was sometimes successfully exploited by 
the workers concerned.  
 
Above all the unpredictable and uneven rhythms of production combined with the 
pressure of the wage system undermined remuneration as a mechanism for binding 
the worker to the plan. Indeed the operation of the “shortage” economy that had come 
into being during the early 1950s had a rhythm and a calendar of its own that was 
impenetrable to the will of the worker, one governed by the dialectic of shortage and 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
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at the end of plan cycle, the rush, as raw materials arrived. This was to form the 
context against which workers were able to exercise a degree of countervailing power 
even at the height of Stalinism in Hungary. 
 
Informal Bargaining and the Particularisation of Working Class Identity 
 
By the end of the Stalinist era in 1953 the attempt to use the wage system to persuade 
the worker to produce more quickly had been destroyed by the different rhythms of 
production created by the operation of the economy at shop floor level. The demands 
that the plan imposed upon enterprise management combined with the environment of 
shortage created a chaotic situation in production but simultaneously gave a degree of 
countervailing power to the workforce. The environment in which production 
occurred and the strategies workers adopted to exercise this countervailing power had 
consequences for the social identities adopted by industrial workers. The workplace 
had become an arena for considerable shop floor bargaining fed by managements' 
need to accommodate workers to cope with the demands of production in a shortage 
economy and worker rejection of the official wage system. 
 
 Many of the more blatant forms that this bargaining took were simply called "norm 
cheating" by the central apparatus. One form was the abuse of the innovation 
movement, that was often found in the metalworking sector to disguise short cuts in 
the production of each piece, a practice that often led to declining quality. Such "norm 
cheating" often took the form of the abuse of elements of the labour competition. In 
the Diósgyõr Steel Mills unskilled workers supplying the furnace were able to earn 
wages 50% higher than normal by engaging in "shock work". These workers 
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∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
officially left their workplace and were simply re-employed by the enterprise as shock 
workers, performing their original job, in order to gain higher wages. There were 
cases reported of workers abandoning the enterprise completely and simply living as 
shock workers as a result. In other cases "cheating" took the form of the foreman 
changing the size of the job done on paper in order to raise the wages of the 
workforce. In the Sztálinváros Brick Factory the foreman simply reported that 2-300 
tons more bricks had been produced than was actually the case. On the Nagyatádi 
construction site the wage fund had been overspent by 147,000 Forints in August 
1953. This was due largely to enterprise management that had paid for 2,500 square 
metres of plastering, as well as the haulage of 770,000 bricks, 825 cubic metres of 
mortar, and 390 cubic metres of concrete. This work had only ever been completed on 
paper 58. This more blatant form of wage manipulation was exceptional in that "norm 
cheating" generally occurred during rushes at the end of the month, or quarter in order 
to fulfil the plan. 
 
Another more subtle form that informal bargaining took was the exploitation by 
management of ambiguities in the work categorisation system to give workers higher 
wages than the central authorities stipulated. Indeed bargaining between managers 
and workers over the categorisation of jobs for which there was a particular shortage 
of labour had become endemic by the early Summer of 1953. At that time the 
Ministry of Heavy Industry and the trade unions intervened to prevent an informal 
reduction of the norms in the Mátyás Rákosi Pipe Factory. The result was a debate 
between the central and the enterprise level organisation about the appropriate 
categories into which warehouse workers should be placed, with the enterprise 
arguing they should go into a higher category than that in which the central authorities 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
wished to place them. The union reported that in steel mills the enterprise 
management commonly shifted maintenance workers, fitters and turners into higher 
wage categories than those centrally stipulated. Among maintenance workers in the 
textile factories such modifications seem to have been quite common and were made 
in order to give workers in these industries wages comparable to those in the 
metalworking sector in order to prevent labour mobility 59. 
 
The classic form shop floor bargaining took, however, was over the norms. One of the 
most notable features of the norms was how certain groups of workers could use their 
position in the production process to informally bargain with management to secure 
norm relaxation. This differed from "norm cheating" in that the latter consisted of 
blatant attempts to defraud management, whilst other forms of bargaining around the 
norms were more subtle. Initially the introduction of unpopular norms was met by a 
series of exaggerated complaints. In the Mátyás Rákosi Machine Factory, some 80% 
of the complaints were described as unrealistic and as a tool in the bargaining process 
between workers and management 60. If this failed to have an effect then the next step 
was for workers to withhold production. In one machine factory, the workers 
regulated the pace of their work in order to underfulfil their norms over a twenty day 
period (50-60% fulfilment). Over the next ten days the enterprise management 
converted them to "shock work" wages, in order to fulfil the monthly plan,  which led 
to norm fulfilment of 200-300%. Often such behaviour led to norm relaxation. In the 
metalworking sector this strategy simply took the form of underestimating the 
capacity of technology to cope with high work intensity 61. This also seems to have 
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been the case with semi-skilled workers operating machines or working on automated 
assembly lines in food processing 62. In construction crane operators had been able to 
bargain to relax the norms. This led to them earning as much as 2500-3000 Forints 
monthly whilst many of their work mates on the site could only earn around 800 
Forints 63. 
 
Some workers were better able than others to successfully secure norm relaxation, and 
this led to a re-shaping of the wage system. In the metal industry, at the Mátyás 
Rákosi Machine Factory the differing importance of the various shops in the 
production process led to wage differentials opening up between the skills depending 
on their area of employment in the factory. Turners’ average hourly wages varied 
from between 5.01 Forints in the lowest paid shop to 6.27 Forints in the highest. The 
biggest difference was among the grinders, the lowest paid earned 4.28 Forints an 
hour whilst those working in the maintenance section could earn 9.88 Forints 64. In 
textiles lax norms were experienced in enterprises where skilled work by hand was 
required. In areas such as flax and hemp, yarn, silk and ready made hosiery 
production the norms for those jobs requiring handicraft production were considerably 
more lax than those for machine workers, with handicraft norms fulfilled by 150-
180% 65. 
 
Maintenance workers were generally able to exploit their position to secure wage 
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advantages through norm relaxation and informal bargaining over the categorisation 
of jobs. In the metal industry the result of such bargaining was to create large wage 
differences between enterprises. In most large enterprises in light industry the 
maintenance staff accounted for some 50-100 workers. The work was not paid 
according to a standardised norm, though wages were generally set according to the 
rates for skilled work in heavy engineering 66. The consequences of this lack of 
standardisation can be illustrated by the problem of the labour mobility of 
maintenance workers between the Almásfüztõ Aluminium Smelter and the 
Almásfüztõ Oil Refining Enterprise. In the aluminium smelter the maintenance staff 
were paid according to the heavy engineering rates, whilst in the oil refinery they 
were paid on the basis of the lower chemical industry rates. The consequence of this 
was that the latter enterprise had serious problems recruiting and retaining 
maintenance staff 67. In mining, low pay for maintenance workers relative to other 
sectors was a major cause of discontent among the workers. Monthly wages were as 
low as 500-600 Forints for some workers in the sector 68. Such a lack of standardised 
payment gave workers considerable scope to employ informal bargaining strategies to 
increase their wages. In one pharmaceuticals plant, for example, maintenance workers 
simply refused to complete work when the enterprise management refused to offer 
them pay for supplementary time 69. The ability of maintenance workers to participate 
in informal bargaining could lead to serious problems.  Indeed in light industry the 
superior capacity of maintenance workers over even skilled workers to bargain 
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informally with management, than even skilled workers in the industries led to 
distortions in the wage distribution. In the Budapest Conserves Factory, for example, 
in August 1953 machinists earned between 1,079 and 1,098 Forints, whilst unskilled 
workers in maintenance, could earn between 1,146 and 1424 Forints monthly 70. 
 
Those workers responsible for supplying materials, and loading and unloading 
loading, were particularly successful in achieving norm relaxation, because of their 
ability to determine the pace of production, through regulating the speed of their 
work. At the Békés County Flour Mills, for example, average norm fulfilment varied 
between 90 and 105%, whilst loading workers could fulfil their norms by 135 to 
140%. At the Szabolcs County Flour Mills, in the third quarter of 1953, average norm 
fulfilment varied at between 103 to 104%, guaranteeing an average monthly wage of 
671 Forints. In this enterprise one loader was able with 20 days work to earn 1175.90 
Forints, whilst one milling grinder in 15 days with 150 hours work earned 847.37 
Forints, and a flour siever with 17 days and 190 hours work could only make 487.60 
Forints. Often the skilled millers earned less than the unskilled loaders 71. 
 
Such informal bargaining contributed enormously to the fragmentation of the 
industrial workforce that had been set in train by the implementation of new systems 
of remuneration during 1949 and 1950. Informal bargaining strategies could only be 
employed successfully by small groups of workers and in many factories were 
generally secured at the expense of other workers. In one Budapest machine factory 
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informal bargaining had undermined relations between the workers on the shop floor 
to such an extent by early 1951 that one union official stated that "the biggest problem 
.... is the lack of good relations between work mates, we should have a friendly 
atmosphere between work groups like that we had a year ago, when we didn't throw 
insults at each other" 72. 
 
Superimposed on to the fragmentation of the industrial workforce was a process that 
can best be described as the particularisation of worker identity, that contributed to 
and was partly driven by the process of informal bargaining 73. This resulted from the 
combination of informal co-operation between management and the workers with the 
re-composition of the workforce resulting from the considerable proletarianisation 
that resulted from forced industrialisation. . This transformation was documented by a 
survey of 20 enterprises located in Budapest in October 1953 employing a total of 
93,000 workers; of these only 62.8% had been workers in 1949, 10.8% were of 
peasant origin, a further 8.8% had been housewives on the eve of the Five Year Plan 
and 4.2% had either been self-employed or had white collar jobs four years 
previously. The survey also indicated that in the provinces the extent of the re-
composition had been much greater 74.  
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Growing official concern about the indiscipline and low skill level of the many new 
recruits had created spaces which small groups of workers could use to secure 
preferential treatment from management. One union official in a western Hungarian 
mining town admitted giving preferential treatment to small groups of more 
experienced workers when applying work discipline regulations. He stated that 
because he believed that "new workers are the ones who absent themselves … if an 
old worker with 18 to 20 years service to the pit came to the factory management 
almost crying to ask that they don't penalise him for being absent, then of course with 
such an old and honest worker we wouldn't use a severe penalty, but with new 
workers who go absent, we are strict" 75. Such spaces were exploited by small groups 
of workers to bargain informally with management over wages, access to tools and 
raw materials and over the implementation of work discipline regulations using 
attributes of skill and experience to secure favourable treatment. Such attributes were 
cultural constructs and their successful deployment served to exclude workers on the 
basis of gender, generation and social origin from access to favourable positions 
within informal wage bargaining. Needless to say this process was deeply subversive 
of class solidarity among industrial workers, though neither did it allow the state to 
enforce its authority on the shop floor 76. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This examination of the attempts of the Stalinist regimes in post-war Hungary to 
discipline labour by binding industrial workers to economic plans through 
individualised systems of remuneration underpinned by a specific “politics of time” 
demonstrates that such policies were strikingly unsuccessful. Instead the major 
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ 
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determinant of work rhythms appears to have been the operation of the "shortage 
economy" itself. Despite of this mismatch between state-led intervention and the 
actual operation of the economy, the institutions that the state used, that is the wage 
system, to ensure that "time" acted as a stick in order to raise productivity, remained 
in place. As a result these attempts became the base for a struggle, largely informal, 
on the shop floor as workers attempted to find ways to reconcile the time embodied in 
the wage system with the "rhythm" of the shortage economy as a means of boosting 
their earnings. 
 
This discussion of wage determination and factory regimes in the context of early 
Socialist Hungary has three important implications for how Stalinism is studied, both 
generally and in its East-Central European context. The first and most important 
implication is that the analysis presented here suggests that approaches which stress 
the dominance of the state in socialist society have misread reality. This article argues 
for the primacy of the realm of the material over the intentions of the political, given 
the way in which the intentions of state rationalisers foundered on the reality of the 
shortage economy. Though this economy was undoubtedly the consequence of state 
action it is difficult to maintain that its perverse functioning was an intended goal of 
this intervention. These "rhythms" caused state-led rationalisation to founder at a shop 
floor level. The focus on the material, as opposed to the political dimensions of the 
Stalinist order, also points out how a repressive state was able to prevent the tensions 
this failure created assuming a "formal" nature. The struggles on the shop floor 
around remuneration were not public, but informal. What is more bargaining tended 
to accept the rules of the game on the shop floor; it was often about bargaining over 
the right to maximise earnings from scarce work, rather than protest about the scarcity 
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of work itself.  
 
This point feeds through into the second major implication of the analysis presented 
here. In opposition to the traditional view of Stalinism as collectivist and monolithic, 
this article has shown how state policy could, at least in the realm of the economy, 
seek to individualise social actors. This process of individualisation occurred at the 
level of policy, in the way that the economic plan was designed to be broken down to 
the individual producer, at the level of institutions, through the wage system or labour 
competition, and to some extent at the level of social response. The actions of the 
state in the realm of production undermined social solidarity. This outcome was re-
inforced by the operation of the shortage economy and worker responses to it, which 
heightened fragmentation of the industrial workforce, undercut the appeal of social 
solidarity, and provided the material base for the particularisation of worker identity. 
 
The third implication of the analysis presented here is more historical, and applies 
explicitly to Stalinism in its East-Central European, and more particularly its 
Hungarian context. It has been widely assumed that during the 1960s and 1970s a 
monolithic Stalinism gave way to a more liberal, less despotic regime which allowed 
greater room for an autonomous social action. The emergence of a tolerated informal 
economic sector and greater economic freedom have been attributed to this wave of 
reform, something, which it is commonly argued, affected the system changes in the 
region in 1989-90. In some accounts informal co-operation between workers and 
managers within the context of “hegemonic” factory regimes, to use Michael 
Burawoy’s term, was a product of reform. The account presented here suggests that 
such institutions emerged under high Stalinism itself, and were due not to reform from 
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above, but the need to survive at local level in the face of an environment of endemic 
shortage. This points to a need to re-examine the history of post-war East-Central 
Europe in a new light, in a way which would use the perspectives of social history and 
pay close attention to the material world in which individuals both produced and 
consumed. Such a re-examination would question many assumptions about the nature 
of state socialism and re-cast our understanding of the relationship between Stalinism, 
post-Stalinism and the events of 1989-90. 
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